As noted last week, UKAS is under heavy scrutiny for its role in the deadly Grenfell Tower fire, which killed 72 people and injured at least 70 others. The UK government’s official Inquiry report laid much of the blame on UKAS for failing to adequately perform its accreditation oversight duties. Had UKAS done its job, the cladding manufacturers and test labs responsible for constructing the building might never have gotten the contracts in the first place, and the building would have been built properly, saving all those lives.

UKAS allegedly made all sorts of promises to the investigators of that report, including to address conflicts of interest that prevented UKAS from performing its duties in the Grenfell case with impartiality. Well, here it is just a week later, and UKAS is already tossing its promises out the window and showing no regard for human life once again.

Full disclosure: the case I am about to talk about is very complicated, and I have not dug into the details yet. I am only discussing one minor part of it, but it’s a doozy.

Lives At Risk (Again)

It seems that a fellow named Conor Chapple filed a complaint against the UK certification body NAPIT. NAPIT is supposed to ensure the quality and safety of construction personnel and companies, including those responsible for electrical, insulation, heating, etc.

Now, I don’t know the details of the original complaint, as I haven’t read it yet. It’s dense, and I need to spend some time on it. But Mr. Chapple’s complaint focused on the electrical safety inspections performed by NAPIT, making this story suddenly sound an awful lot like what led to the deadly Grenfell disaster. The NAPIT services are then accredited by UKAS.

One of the issues raised by Mr. Chapple is that NAPIT “continues to certify installations under outdated standards (BS 7671:2018)… despite the adoption of BS 7671:2020 and its 2022 amendments.” I did a little poking, and can see the changes made to that spec have to do largely with the sections on “protection against electric shock,” “protection against thermal effects,” and “protection against voltage disturbances and electromagnetic disturbance.

The changes are specifically related to safety-critical aspects, not just grammar and punctuation. In fact, the revised spec specifically says, in one section, “Regulation 443.4.1 now requires protection against transient overvoltages to be provided where the consequence caused by the overvoltage could result in: serious injury to, or loss of, human life.” (Emphasis added by me.)

If true, then NAPIT is putting lives at risk by using an outdated standard.

NAPIT’s response to Mr. Chapple was not good, so he escalated the matter to UKAS. UKS, of course, cleared NAPIT, causing Mr. Chapple to raise a new complaint against UKAS itself, alleging violations of its obligations and requirements. To no one’s surprise, UKAS cleared itself of all wrongdoing, and seems to have violated a whole ton of ISO 17011 accreditation body requirements in the process. Worse, a significant violation is related to conflicts of interest, which UKAS promised the Grenfell Inquiry it was taking care of.

Conflicts of Interest Return

Kevin Belson

Assigned to Mr. Chapple’s case was UKAS’ Kevin Belson, somewhat of a gadfly in ISO accreditation circles.  The problem here is that Belson has also held roles as the Chair of the EA Certification Committee (which oversees UKAS) and the Technical Committee within the IAF (which — yes — also oversees UKAS). All of these organizations receive some sort of revenue from NAPIT through its UKAS accreditation.  There was never a chance that Belson, a career figure at UKAS, would conduct an independent probe into his employer or against any of the oversight bodies for which he also works.

UKAS should have appointed an independent investigator but — much how they ignored conflicts of interest in the Grenfell disaster — they did not.

Here is what ISO 17011 says about such things:

7.12.8 The decision to be communicated to the complainant shall be made by, or reviewed and approved by, individual(s) not involved in the activities in question.

Making matters worse, UKAS then took punitive action against Mr. Chapple, writing to him:

UKAS will not offer any further comments on this matter, and we will also not be responding to any further communications from you, either in relation to your complaint or your allegations that UKAS has failed to meet its obligations, which are not upheld.

This is yet another overt violation of ISO 17011, which disallows such punitive responses:

7.12.10 Investigation and decision on complaints shall not result in any discriminatory actions against the complainant.

You see, there exists the fact that Mr. Chapple may, at some future time, uncover a wholly unrelated complaint; UKAS has shut the door on all communications with him. If Mr. Chapple discovers something happening next week that could result in people dying, UKAS and Belson won’t look at it simply because they are miffed at having their conflicts of interest called out.

UKAS Ignores NAPIT Violations

It gets worse. NAPIT is also held to these rules, and is not supposed to attack complainants and whistleblowers. The ISO accreditation scheme has long-standing expectations that accredited certification bodies must demonstrate an “openness to complaints.” But what did NAPIT do? They had their lawyers fire off a formal cease-and-desist letter to Chapple, again, trying to shut down his complaints.

Mr. Chapple argues that this is a violation of UK law, which prohibits “strategic lawsuits against public participation” or “SLAPP suits.” The US has similar legislation aimed at preventing companies that can afford expensive attorneys from harassing poorer litigants into dropping valid complaints. (I mounted an anti-SLAPP suit in the US, but the defendant caved early, so we never had to bring the anti-SLAPP argument before the court.)

But remember: despite this evidence, UKAS claims NAPIT did nothing wrong. Not to put too fine a point on it, but UKAS is wholly wrong here. If someone dies as a result of NAPIT’s inspection practices, UKAS — and Belson personally — will be in the wringer for it. And they should be.

If you’re reading this, Kevin, I want you to re-read this part. You can be held personally liable if someone dies due to NAPIT negligence. This could mean criminal charges, so you wouldn’t just lose your home, you’d go to prison.

Oh, and naturally, the EA sided with UKAS, ignoring the fact that Belson has worked for both organizations. The IAF, which should have weighed in by now, has done nothing.

This Isn’t the First Time

But wait… there’s more.

Back in 2022, we reported on the electrical scheme managed by CertSure, which also claims to prove conformity with the BSI 7671 specification. In that case, we pointed out that an independent report published by Engineering + Technology entitled “Exposed: The National Wiring Scandal Putting Lives at Risk” challenged the efficacy of the CertSure program and the role of NAPIT. The article concluded:

While some firms might have NICEIC or NAPIT on their sleeves or the side of the van, they are often “totally incompetent.”

E+T didn’t connect the dots further, but Oxebridge did. The CertSure program is, of course, accredited by UKAS.

Despite the public reporting by E+T and alleged risks to the public, the CertSure NICEIC program remains fully accredited by UKAS.

UKAS Learned Nothing

I want to be very clear here. If the allegations against NAPIT are true (and, for the fifth time, I haven’t read all of them, and I am saying “if“), then it’s conceivable someone could get killed due to faulty electrical work done by a NAPIT-certified entity—all under a UKAS accreditation scheme.

UKAS has an obligation to the public — and to ensure its own people don’t get tossed in jail — to do a thorough investigation. And they should not ignore improper behavior by NAPIT in the process, nor should they be engaged in any form of conflicts of interest… ever.

This is another Grenfell fire disaster waiting to happen. UKAS learned nothing. Matt Gantley and his gang do not care how many people die under certifications issued with the UKAS logo on them, so long as those using the logo pay their fees. UKAS will continue to accredit companies doing work in Russia, and will continue to violate UK and international sanctions. UKAS will continue to accredit companies in China subjecting Uyghurs to forced labor and rape. The UKAS logo will continue to appear on certificates owned by Malaysian companies cited for the use of slaves.

There appears to be no international law that UKAS will not ignore or violate as long as the UK government refuses to take action against Gantley and his thugs.

 

Advertisements

ISO 14001 Implementation