The Strange Connection between US Accreditation Body IAS and Iran

The US has pretty strict export regulations and sanctions prohibiting companies from dealing with Iran, but that hasn’t stopped the accreditation body International Accreditation Service (IAS) from finding a way to get money from the country anyway.

Now, to be clear, it does not appear that IAS is doing anything illegal here… yet. I’ve spoken to two ITAR and export control experts, and they both said the situation isn’t clear-cut, and on the face of it, no sanctions or laws appear to have been broken. But neither of the experts I spoke to are lawyers, and they both cautioned against taking their comments as legal advice.

In some unrelated searches on IAF CertSearch, I accidentally found a few companies that hold various ISO certificates issued by different certification bodies. But I began to notice a pattern: Of those accredited by a US accreditation body, it appears only IAS offers this.

For example, Persi Iran Gas and Iran Silicate Industries are both certified by BRSM Sertifikasyon Ve Denetim Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi out of Turkey, which is accredited by IAS. Then, Iran Bronze Foundry Industrial‏ ‏Group is certified by G-CERTI, also accredited by IAS.

The case that troubles me, though, is related to a company called Iran Oilfield Supply Kish. It is also certified by G-CERTI, and its certificate bears the IAS accreditation mark. I confirmed that this certificate is valid per IAF CertSearch.

G-CERTI is a South Korean certification body that seems to offer certification to many potentially shady clients. This is common for South Korean CBs, as the Korean Accreditation Board (KAB) is one of the most corrupt in the world today. KAB does not apply any controls over its client CBs, allowing them to violate ISO 17021-1 at will. But IAS, for all its problems, is still generally better at these things than KAB.

The problem here is that Iran Oilfield Supply Kish was at the center of a high-profile criminal case from 2020, where a Florida businessman was found to have exported products to the company in violation of US law. Per Kenneth Rijock’s Financial Crime Blog:

A US District Judge in the Northern District of Florida has sentenced a Pensacola executive to forty months in Federal Prison for attempting to export a large Solar Mars gas turbine, and parts and components, to Iran. James Meharg was convicted of violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and Federal Criminal law,  when he conspired to export and deliver a turbine core engine to Iran.

The defendant’s plan was to route the turbine through Sharjah, UAE using falsified documents. The eqipment was later to be diverted to Iran. he received $250,000, in funds laundered through a front company in Dubai. The true end-user was an Iranian energy company, the Iran Oilfield Supply Kish Company.

I checked with my export control guys, and they both said it is unlikely IAS would be held to the same rule, even though — technically — IAS is getting money that originates in Iran. The money, in this case, includes accreditation fees collected by G-CERTI in South Korea from the Iranian client and then passed to IAS in the United States. But there’s no actual export of a restricted product here, and even though US companies are prohibited from working with Iran, the inclusion of G-CERTI as a middleman probably allows IAS to continue to do this.

Still, though, it says something about IAS that they are okay with working with countries labeled as exporters of international terrorism while claiming to be a good, patriotic US company. We all know IAS is actually an Indian company and that they use their California headquarters to try and dodge the stigma of poor Indian quality and corruption. But it would be nice if they actually adopted US positions and didn’t just use a US street address.

So, we see the international accreditation scheme actors really just have little concern for the optics of working with anyone they want, ignoring things like sanctions and terrorism, if they can make a buck doing it. Remember, UKAS is busy accrediting CBs who certify companies using slaves, for heaven’s sake, as well as continuing to violate UK law and perform accreditation services in Russia. Another US accreditation body, UAF, appears to be engaged in full-on tax fraud, claiming to be a US 501(c)(3) not-for-profit, but then not actually filing taxes in the United States, despite having dozens of clients. Japan’s JAB continues to allow its logo to appear on companies that are routinely found to be falsifying crucial test data in industries like automotive and aerospace manufacturing.

Other ABs are also operating in Iran, such as the Standards Council of Canada and Australia’s JAS-ANZ, but I haven’t checked if those countries have any prohibitions against Iran. But — once more — it’s really bad optics.

The IAF should be policing this, but doesn’t. For the UAF tax fraud complaint, the IAF refused to investigate at all, handing it over to an Australian regional organization, APAC, to poke into. Suffice it to say, APAC isn’t aware of US tax law, and they are corrupt as hell anyway, so that won’t ever get resolved.

Ironically, I wrote a while back about the self-accredited certificate mill American Global Standards (AGS), run by California’s Stephen Kenneally, and how they issue certs in Iran. In that case, Keneally himself is likely getting the money directly from Iran, without a middleman, but he denied it to me in an email. The Dept. of State hasn’t stopped him, so is unlikely to stop the IAF and its gang of accreditation bodies.

Proving once again there is very little to distinguish the so-called “recognized” accreditation bodies from the certificate mills.

Anyway, it’s all good news for Iran!