As reported previously, the IAQG is pushing ahead with a bafflingly bad idea to use “nonconformities per audit day” as a performance metric for AS9100 aerospace auditors. These changes will be hardcoded in the new revision of AS9104/3, the official rules for aerospace auditors. The move would upend the entire notion of third-party conformity assessments, which relies on findings being driven by objective evidence, not arbitrary performance goals.
The problem is made worse by the fact it was at least partially developed by representatives from certification bodies like Smithers and BSI, which stand to make money on the deal. CBs can charge clients extra fees for “nonconformity processing,” a practice that was already suspicious, and now stands to become full-on B2B fraud.
Worse still, IAQG documents also reveal that another metric of auditor performance will be “upheld complaints,” while allowing the CBs themselves to decide when a complaint will be upheld or not. The AS9100 scheme already has a problem with CBs refusing to uphold customer complaints under any conditions whatsoever (see here and here, for example), and the new AS9104/3 rules will give them a financial incentive to worsen this practice. No CB is going to want to have official metrics showing its auditors are terrible, so they will now reject any customer complaint out of hand.
Here’s a slide from an IAQG presentation posted the other day on LinkedIn, marked up by me:
What’s worse is that one of the existing IAQG metrics is “OASIS ticket processing time.” Showing they have no use for metrics that might reveal their corruption, the IAQG has ignored an official OASIS ticket on the “nonconformity quota” issue for over eight months. (See the screenshot below which shows three such open tickets):
Meanwhile, the IAQG has cut off all communications on any issue whatsoever with Oxebridge, including through the OASIS system as well as email. Andy Maher, who was recently re-elected to its head slot, continues to refuse to reply to requests for clarification or on any matter at all. The IAQG just outright refused to acknowledge a formal complaint against its auditor certification body, Probitas, and that company’s head Rich DeMary for (now) over two years. (In that case, DeMary ruled that aerospace auditors were allowed to falsify their industry experience, provided they did so after paying Probitas for auditor certification.)
The new performance metrics will be wholly useless from the start. Auditors will immediately begin drumming up bogus nonconformities in order to meet some unpublished quota goals, while the CBs involved charge clients extra fees for processing those nonconformities. If a client complains, the CB will follow the IAQG’s lead in ignoring the complaint outright, or simply ruling against the client and closing the book without discussion. The aerospace industry will back them up, by continuing to demand AS9100 certification as a condition of doing business.
Which leaves us with the problem of how to develop a solution. Boeing and Lockheed dominate the IAQG and AS9100 committees, but have refused to rein in their employees — such as Alan Daniels — who allow such corrupt practices to turn into official policy. the primes don’t really care if AS9100 results in financial hardship for the supply chain, because it’s driven by lazy acquisition staff who want a piece of paper (the AS9100 cert) to justify checking a box in their approved vendor system; God forbid they should actually find out for themselves if their suppliers are good or not.
With the IAQG operating out of Belgium, it’s not directly held to US law, and therefore out of reach of Federal Trade Commission anti-fraud enforcement. It is the beauty of international standards committees that their trans-national state makes them hard to sue.
But — as it turns out — not impossible. I’m researching ways we can use the US courts to force the IAQG to reverse course anyway. Much of the IAQG material is managed by the SAE, which is a US company, and there is some existing case law that suggests we could go after the parties involved in such decision making, rather than the IAQG mothership. (In fact, the IAQG would likely wriggle out of any lawsuit, anyway, claiming they only publish the work of the committee.)
This means going after companies like Smithers, who helped cook up this scam and stand to benefit from it, as well as pursuing legal action against the persons involved directly. It may or may not be a class action suit, as previously considered. In short, we may not need a class.
The far simpler legal avenue would be to get an emergency court injunction against SAE — which is a US company, and subject to US courts — for publishing AS9104/3. The IAQG can dream up whatever rules it wants, but until they are officially published by SAE, they don’t actually go into effect. For now, AS9104/3 is available, but a court could order it be retracted pending an industry investigation for fraud and risk to passenger safety.
Meanwhile, if the IAQG has a simpler explanation, they should break their silence and communicate it. It could well be that they have already figured a way to address the controversy and eliminate the corruption and fraud aspects. But by remaining silent, and acting like criminals, they are not helping matters.
If your company has been affected by AS9100 corruption, contact me here to see if we can help. Everyone else should consider a Legal Fund donation to help fund these efforts.
Christopher Paris is the founder and VP Operations of Oxebridge. He has over 30 years’ experience implementing ISO 9001 and AS9100 systems, and helps establish certification and accreditation bodies with the ISO 17000 series. He is a vocal advocate for the development and use of standards from the point of view of actual users. He is the writer and artist of THE AUDITOR comic strip, and is currently writing the DR. CUBA pulp novel series. Visit www.drcuba.world
